Introduction

31
In a natural environment, choosing the best of multiple options is frequently critical for an organism's survival. 32 Such decisions are often value-based, in which case the reward is determined by the chosen item (such as 33 when subjects chose between food items; Figure 1a ), or perceptual, in which case subjects receive a fixed 34 reward if they pick the correct option (Figure 1b) . Compared to binary choice paradigms 1-3 , much less is 35 known about the computational principles underlying decisions with more than two options 4 . Some studies 36 have suggested that decisions among 3 or 4 options could be solved with coupled drift diffusion models [4] [5] [6] , 37 which are optimal for binary choices 7 , but, as we'll show, become sub-optimal once the number of choices 38 grows beyond two. Another option for modelling such choices is to use "race models" (RMs). In RMs, the 39 momentary choice preference is encoded by competing evidence accumulators, one per options, which trigger 40 a choice as soon as one of them reaches a decision threshold (Figure 1c) . Such standard RMs imply that both 41 the races and the static decision criteria are independent across individual options. However, in contrast to 42 race models, the nervous system features dynamic neural interactions across races, such as activity 43 normalization 8,9 and a global urgency signal 10 . Whether such coupled races are compatible with optimal 44 decision policies for 3 or more choices is unknown. 45 At the behavioral level, subjects choosing between 3 or more options exhibit several seemingly suboptimal 46 behaviors, such as the similarity effect or violations of both the regularity principle and the independence of 47 irrelevant alternatives (IIA) principle. The last effect, the violation of the IIA, refers to the observation that 48 when choosing between two similar options, the subject's ability to choose is affected by the presence of a 49 third option even if this third option is never picked 11 . However, before concluding that such behaviors are 50 suboptimal, it is critical to first derive the optimal policy and check whether it is compatible with this policy. 51 Here, we adopt such a normative approach. By contrast to previous models motivated by biological 52 implementations 12-15 , we start by deriving the optimal, reward-maximizing strategy for multi-alternative 53 decision-making, and then ask how this strategy can be implemented by biologically plausible mechanisms. 54 To do so, we first extend a recently developed theory of value-based decision-making with binary options 7 to 55 general -alternative cases, revealing nonlinear and time-dependent decision-boundaries in a 56 high-dimensional belief space. Next, we show that geometric symmetries allow reducing the optimal strategy 57 to a simple neural mechanism. This yields a novel extension of race models with time-dependent 58 activity-normalization controlled by an urgency signal 10 . 59 The model provides a new perspective on how normalization and an urgency signal cooperate to implement 60 close-to-optimal decisions for multi-alternative choices. We also demonstrate that the optimal policy is 61 compatible with divisive normalization, a form of normalization that has been widely reported throughout the 62 nervous system 8, 9 . With this addition, and in the presence of internal variability, we report that the network 63 replicates the similarity effect as well as violates both the independent irrelevant alternative principle and the 64 regularity principle. Thus, our model isolates the functional components required for optimal decision-making 65
Figure 1
Multi-alternative decision tasks and the standard race model. (a) An example value-based task in laboratory settings. In a typical experiment, participants are rewarded with one of the objects they chose (in a randomly selected trial from the whole trial sequence). (b) An example perceptual task, in which the participants are required to choose the highest contrast Gabor patch -in this example the bottom-left one. (c) The race model (RM). The colored traces represent the accumulated evidence for individual options ( 1 , 2 and 3 ). In the RM, the accumulation process is terminated when either race reaches a constant decision boundary. (d) An alternative representation for the same RM, in which the races of accumulated evidence are shown as an -dimensional diffusion. With this representation, the decision boundary for each option corresponds to a side of an -dimensional cube, reflecting the independence of decision boundaries across options in the RM.
(158 words) differs substantially from that of standard RMs (Figure 1d) . Importantly, we found that they have an 115 important symmetry: they are parallel to the diagonal-the line connecting (0,0,0) and (1,1,1) 116 (Supplementary Note 1 shows this more formally). This symmetry implies that any diffusion parallel to the 117 diagonal line is irrelevant to the final decision, such that we only need to consider the projection of the 118 diffusion process onto the hyperplane orthogonal to this line (Figure 2b) . The decision boundaries remain 119 nonlinear even in this projection, as depicted by the curvatures of the solid lines in Figure 2b . Note that the 120 nonlinearity of the decision boundaries is specific to multi-alternative choice situations (i.e., ≥ 3). Indeed, 121
for binary choices, our derivation indicates that the projection of the diffusion process onto an − 1 122 dimensional subspace becomes a projection onto a line since = 2. On this line, the stopping boundaries are 123 just two points and therefore cannot exhibit any nonlinearities. In fact, for = 2, the optimal policy 124 corresponds to the well-known drift diffusion model of decision making 7, 17 . 125
Numerical solutions also revealed that the optimal decision boundaries evolve over time: they approach each 126 other as time elapses, and finally collapse (Figure 2b , solid curves). These nonlinear collapsing boundaries 127 differ from the linear and static ones of previous approximate models, such as multi-hypothesis sequential 128 probability ratio tests (MSPRTs) [21] [22] [23] , which are known to be only asymptotically optimal under specific 129 assumptions (Methods). 130 We show in the Supplementary Note 4 that these results generalize to models in which the streams of noisy 131 momentary evidence are correlated in time, either with short range temporal correlations, as is often observed 132 in spikes trains, or with long range temporal correlations as postulated for instance in the linear ballistic 133 accumulator model 24, 25 . Our results also apply to experiments such as the ones performed by Thura and 134 Cisek 26,27 in which the momentary evidence are accumulated directly on the screen, in which case there is no 135 need for latent integration but the stopping bounds on the observed accumulated evidence remain the same as 136 in Figure 2a . 137 
Circuit implementation of the optimal policy 138
In the optimal policy we have derived, the evidence accumulation is simple: it involves accumulators, each 139 of which sum up their associated momentary evidence independent of the other accumulators. By contrast, the 140 stopping rule is complex: at every time step, the policy requires computing time-dependent nonlinear 141 functions that form the individual stopping boundaries. This rule is nonlocal because whether an accumulator 142 stops depends not only on its own state but also on that of all the other accumulators. A simpler stopping rule 143 would be one in which a decision is made whenever one of the accumulators reaches a particular threshold 144 value, as in independent RMs. This, however, would require a nonlinear and nonlocal accumulation process in 145 order to implement the same policy through a proper variable transformation. Nonetheless, such a solution 146 endowed with a simple winner-take-all mechanism that selects a choice once the threshold is reached by one 148 of the accumulators. 149 Armed with this insight, we found that a recurrent network with independent thresholds, as depicted in Figure  150 2c, can indeed approximate the optimal solution very closely. component of the vector ̃ at time t) which is found all over cortex and in particular in LIP 8 . 159 On the faster time scale, activity is projected onto a manifold defined by 1 ∑ ( ) = ( ), (shown as a gray 160 surface in Figure 2d) Supplementary Note 2 for further details). This process is stopped whenever one of the integrators reaches a 164 preset threshold. The choice of this projection was motivated by two key factors. First, this particular form 165 ensures that the projection is parallel to the diagonal, the line connecting (0,0,0) and (1,1,1). As we have 166 seen, diffusion along this axis is indeed irrelevant. Second, the use of a nonlinear function f implies that we do 167 not merely project on the hyperplane orthogonal to the diagonal. Instead, we project onto a nonlinear manifold. 168 This step is what allow us to approximate the original complex stopping surfaces with simpler independent 169 bounds on each of the integrators as illustrated in Figure 2d (see Supplementary Note 2 for a formal 170 explanation). The time dependent urgency signal, u(t), implements a collapsing bound, which is also part of 171 the optimal policy (Figure 2b) . Indeed, this urgency signals brings all the neurons closer to their threshold and, 172 as such, is equivalent to the collapse of the stopping bounds over time (Figure 2d) . 173 Equations 2, 3, and 4 can be turned into a single differential equation (see Eq. 40 in Supplementary Note). 174 The iterative difference equations we show here are a particular form of the implementation, making it easier 175 to interpret the diffusion process. Importantly, Equations 2 and 3 provide a generalization of divisive 176 normalization which ensures that evidence is still integrated optimally over time. The optimal decision policy for 3-alternative choices. (a) The derived optimal decision boundaries in the diffusion space. In contrast to the standard race model's decision boundaries (Figure 1d) , they are nonlinear, but symmetric with respect to the diagonal (i.e., the vector (1,1,1)). (b) Lower-dimensional projections of decision boundaries at different time points. The solid curves are the optimal decision boundaries projected onto the plane orthogonal to the diagonal (the black triangle in panel a). The dashed curves indicate the effective decision boundaries implemented by the circuit in panel c. (c) The circuit approximating the optimal policy. Like RMs, it features constant decision thresholds that are independently applied to individual options. However, the evidence accumulation process is now modulated by recurrent global inhibition after a nonlinear activation function (the "normalization" term) and a time-dependent global bias input ("urgency signal"), and rescaled ("divisive normalization"). (d) Schematic illustrations of why the circuit in panel c can implement the optimal decision policy. The nonlinear recurrent normalization and urgency signal constrain the neural population states to a time-dependent manifold (the gray surfaces). Evidence accumulation corresponds to a diffusion process on this nonlinear ( − 1 dimensional) manifold. The stopping bounds are implemented as the intersections (the colored thick curves) of the manifold and the cube (colored thin lines), in which the cube represents the independent, constant decision thresholds for the individual choice options. Divisive normalization rescales the space of evidence accumulation, leaving the relative distances between the accumulators and stopping bounds intact (not shown). Due to the urgency signal, the manifold moves toward the corner of the cube as the time elapses, causing the intersections (i.e., the stopping bounds) to collapse onto each other over time. urgency signal (Methods). When these parameters are optimized to maximize reward rate, the network 180 approximates very closely the optimal stopping bounds (Figure 2b) . As a result, the reward rate achieved by 181 the network is within 98% and 95% of the optimal reward rate for 3 and 4 options, respectively (across a wide 182 range of prior distributions over rewards, Methods). 183 A simple extension of this network can be used to model other types of task such as the one used by Thura and 184
Cisek
26,27 in which the momentary evidence available on the screen is in fact the accumulated evidence since 185 the beginning of the trial. All that is needed is to remove the temporal integration step in the input neuron, 186 since this step is now superfluous. Normalization and urgency improve the task performance. Relative reward rates in value-based (left) and perceptual tasks (right). To quantify the contribution of each circuit component, we compared the performance of four different circuit models: (i) the standard race model (RM) with independent evidence accumulation within each accumulator, (ii) an RM with only an urgency signal, (iii) an RM with only normalization, and (iv) the full model with both urgency signal and normalization. We quantified the reward rates of models 1-3 ("reduced models") relative to that of the full model by Rel ≡ ( − Rand )/( Full − Rand ), where ( = 1,2,3) denotes the reward rates of reduced models 1-3; Rand = ̅ / is the baseline reward rate of a decision-maker who makes immediate random choices after trial onset.
Full is the reward rate of the full model with both normalization and urgency. The overall results were similar for perceptual decisions, in which the decision-maker is rewarded based on 206 whether the response is correct or incorrect (Figure 3, right) . Thus, normalization and urgency signal 207 contribute to improving task performance in both value-based and perceptual decision-making tasks. 208
Relation to physiological and behavioral findings 209
Urgency signal 210 We examined how neural dynamics and behavior predicted by the proposed circuit relates to previous 211 physiological and behavioral findings. First, we found that the average activity in model neurons rises over signals are extracted by averaging over neural activities across the entire recorded population, including 217 different stimulus conditions. The rationale behind this procedure is that the urgency signal has been 218 postulated as a uniform additional input to all parietal neurons involved in the evidence accumulation process. 219 A signal extracted this way differs from the function ( ) in our model, which is followed by constraining 220 the activity nonlinearly through recurrent neural dynamics, and thus does not trivially relate to the empirically 221 observed urgency signals. Nonetheless, the average activity in model neurons was, through simulations, found 222 to replicate the temporal increase, consistent with the physiological recording in LIP neurons 10 ( Figure 4b) . 223 
Decrease in offset activities in multi-alternative tasks 224
Second, it has been reported that the initial "offset" (i.e., the average neural activity) of evidence 225 accumulation 10,28 decreases as the number of options increases (Figure 4b ), although to our knowledge no 226 normative explanation has been offered for this observation. Interestingly, our circuit model replicates this 227
Figure 4
The model replicates the neuronal urgency signal and Hic ' law in choice reaction times (RTs). (a) Urgency signals in lateral intraparietal (LIP) cortex neurons (top) and in the model (bottom). In typical physiological experiments, urgency signals are extracted by averaging over neural activities across the entire recorded population, including different stimulus conditions. The rationale behind this procedure is that the urgency signal has been considered as a uniform additional input to all parietal neurons involved in the evidence accumulation process. A signal extracted this way is not exactly the same as the global input signal (function ( ) in Figure 2c ) to the circuit, which includes nonlinear activity normalization through recurrent neural dynamics, and thus does not trivially relate to the empirically observed urgency signals. Nonetheless, the average activity in model neurons was found to replicate the temporal increase, including the saturating temporal dynamics. accuracy and reaction time (RT), but has a proportionally stronger effect on accuracy such that the reward rate 231 increases. On the other hand, increasing the number of options while leaving the initial offset unchanged 232 causes a decrease in both accuracy and reaction time, and an associated drop in reward rate. Thus, to 233 counter-act this drop, we need to lower the initial offset, resulting in a lower optimal offset for a larger number 234 of options. The change in the optimal offset size also explains the behavioral effects in RTs as described 235 
below. 236
Hick's law in choice RTs 237
Third, the change in the optimal offset also explains the behavioral effects in choice RTs known as "Hick's 238 law" 29,30 . Hick's law is one of the most robust properties of choice RTs in perceptual decision tasks 29, 30 . In its 239 classic form, it suggests the linear relationship = + log( + 1) between mean RT and the logarithm 240 of the number of options ( ). Our model replicates this near-logarithmic relationship (Figure 4c) . The 241 increased RT for a larger number of options is concordant with the decrease in offset activities as described in 242 the previous section. Interestingly, the RT dependency on the number of options tends to be much weaker for 243 value-based than perceptual decisions. 244 
Value normalization 245
Fourth, our model replicates suppressive effects of neurally encoded values among individual options. In 246 particular, the activity of the LIP neurons encodes values of targets inside the neuronal receptive fields, but is 247 also affected by values associated with targets displayed outside the receptive fields 8, 9, 31 . The larger the total 248 target values outside these receptive fields, the lower the neural activity, which is usually described as 249 normalization. The model replicates these suppressive effects (Figure 5a) . 250 
Violation of IIA 251
So far, our neural model only has one source of variability, namely, the noise corrupting the momentary 252 evidence. There are, however, other sources of variability that are quite likely to exist in brain. For instance, 253 the decision maker must learn how to properly adjust the decision bounds in order to optimize reward rate, 254 which would result in variability in the value of the bound from trial to trial. There is experimental evidence 255 suggesting that learning can indeed induce extra variability in decision making tasks 32 . The variability in these 256 bounds could also be purposely induced by neural circuits to ensure that the decision maker does not always 257 choose the option with the highest value but also explore alternatives. Such an exploration behavior is critical 258 in environments in which the value of the options varies over time, which is common in real world situations. 259 In our neural model, we added such extra variability directly to the accumulator, which is mathematically 260 equivalent to adding it to the bound. Despite this extra variability, our neural model continues to outperform 261 the race model (Figure 5c ). Stripping the normalization from the full model results in a large drop in reward 262 rate with a further drop, though less pronounced, when the urgency signal is also removed. 263 Importantly, this version of the model also replicates apparently "irrational" behavior in humans and animals 264 which violates the principle of "independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA)"
33
, an axiomatic property 265 assumed in traditional rational theories of choice 34, 35 . Behavioral studies have shown that the choice between 266 two high-valued options depends on the value of a third alternative option [36] [37] [38] [39] [40] [41] , even if the value of this third 267 option is so low that it is never chosen. One example of such an interaction is shown in Figure 5b . In this 268 experiment, subjects found it increasingly harder to pick among their two top choices as the value of the third 269 option is increased. Our noisy neural model exhibits a similar violation of the IIA (Figure 5b) , which is 270 difference between the two top options as the value of the third option is increased, making these two options 272 harder to distinguish due the presence of internal variability. 273 
Violation of the regularity principle 274
In multi-alternative decision making, subjects not only violate the IIA but also the regularity principle. The 275 regularity principle asserts that adding extra options cannot increase the probability of selecting an existing 276 option. We have found that the same model that violates the IIA also violates this regularity principle. At first, 277 this may seem counterintuitive. Introducing a third option into a choice set must decrease the probability of 278 picking either of the first two options, which is consistent with the regularity principle. However, consider the 279 probability of picking option 1 when option 2 is more valuable. In the absence of a third option, this 280 probability will tend to be very small. When the third option is introduced, and its value is increased, the 281 violation of the IIA implies that the probability of picking option 1, relative to option 2, will increase, as 282 illustrated by the shallower psychometric curves in Figure 5b . Therefore, two factors are at play here, with 283 opposite effects: the presence of a third option implies that choices 1 and 2 are picked less often, but the 284 probability of picking option 1 increases as a result of the IIA violation. Our simulations reveal that the second 285 factor dominates when the value of option 1 is smaller than that of option 2, as illustrated in Figure 6a . 286 The similarity effect 287 Our model also replicates the similarity effect that has been reported in the literature 40, 42, 43 . This effect refers 288 to the fact that when subjects are given a third option which is similar to, say, option 1, the probability of 289 choosing option 1 decreases. To model this effect, we postulated that each object is defined by a set of features 290
Figure 6
Regularity and similarity principles. (a) Violation of the regularity principle. When a third choice is introduced, the probability of choosing option 1 increases as the value of option 3 increases. This effect is only observed option 1 is much less valuable than option 2. (b) The similarity effect: Adding a third option, similar to option 1, reduces the probability of choosing option 1 relative to option 2 as the value of option 3 increases. The inset shows that the probability of picking option 1 also decreases as the value of option 3 increases. (c) The strength of the similarity effect increases with time within the course of a single trial, as shown by the decrease in the probability of choosing option 1 as time elapses. features. This overlap implies that the stream of value samples for the two similar options are correlated, while 294 being independent for the third, dissimilar option. Accordingly, we simulated a 3-way race in which the 295 momentary evidence for options 1 and 3 are positively correlated. As illustrated in Figure 6b , we found that 296 the probability of choosing option 1 decreases relative to option 2 as the value of option 3 increases, thus 297 replicating the similarity effect. As has been observed experimentally 44 ,45 , we found that the similarity effect 298 grows over time during the course of a single trial Figure 6c . 299 
Predictions 300
Our model makes a number of experimental predictions at both the behavioral and neural levels (see 301
Supplementary Note 3 for further details). 302
First, during evidence accumulation, the neural population activity should be near an − 1 dimensional 303 continuous manifold (i.e., a nonlinear surface), where is the number of choices (Figure 2d ). This is a 304 direct consequence of evidence accumulation paired with nonlinear normalization. As the activity of 305 neurons is -dimensional, and since ≪ in general, our prediction implies that neural activity should be 306 constrained to a small subspace of the neural activity space. This prediction can be tested with standard 307 dimensionality reduction techniques using multi-electrode recordings although this analysis should be done 308 carefully since our model also predicts that the position of this manifold changes over time. Failure to take this 309 time dependency into account could significantly bias the estimate of the dimensionality of the constraining 310 manifold. Our theory makes 11 additional predictions related to existence and properties of the manifold 311 which are listed in Supplementary Note 3. 312 Second, our model correctly predicted the decrease in the initial activity offset value of LIP neurons with the 313 number of choices (the offset is the baseline firing rate value right before evidence accumulation). Remarkably, 314 this offset decrease results from an economic strategy that maximizes the reward rates by balancing the speed 315 and accuracy in a long sequence of trials under the opportunity cost for future rewards. Thus, the offset should 316 also be modulated by other reward rate manipulations. In particular, we predict that increasing the average 317 reward rate by either increasing the reward associated with the choices or decreasing the inter-trial interval 318 should raise the offset for a fixed number of choices. 319 Third, previous studies have considered two types of strategies for multi-alternative decision making: the 320 'max-vs.-average' and the 'max-vs.-next' 6,46,47 . In the former, the winning race is the first one to reach a 321 particular difference between its own state and the average of the other races (Figure 7b) . In the 322 'max-vs.-next', it is the difference between the top race and the second best one that matters (Figure 7c) . Our 323 theory predicts that subjects should smoothly transition between these two modes depending on the pattern of 324 rewards across choices (Figure 7a) , a prediction that can be tested with standard psychophysics experiments. 325
Figure 7
The optimal policy predicts a smooth transition between the 'max vs next' and the 'max vs average' decision strategies depending on the relative values of the three options. (a) The stopping bounds for the optimal policy after projecting the diffusion onto the hyperplane orthogonal to the diagonal. (b) The stopping bounds corresponding to the 'max vs average" strategy (thic colored lines). In this strategy, the decision-ma er computes the difference between each option's value estimate and the average of the remaining options' values and triggers a choice when this difference hits a threshold. The stopping bounds in this case overlap with the optimal bounds from panel a (shown here as thin colored lines) in the center but not on the side. (c) The stopping bounds for the 'max vs next' strategy (thic lines). In this strategy, the decision-maker compares the best and second-best value estimates, and makes a choice when this difference exceeds a threshold. In a three-alternative choice, this is implemented with three pairs of linear decision boundaries (colored thick lines) corresponding to the three possible combinations of two options. In contrast to the bounds for the max vs average strategy, the bounds for the max vs next strategy overlap with the optimal bounds (thin colored lines) on the edge of the triangle but not in the center. (d) When all three options are equally good, the diffusion of the particle is isotropic and is therefore more likely to hit the stopping bounds in their centers, where they overlap with the max vs average strategy. (e) When one option is much better than the other two, the diffusion is now biased toward the center of the bound corresponding to the good option, which is once again equivalent to the max vs average strategy. (f) When two options are equally good, while the third is much worse, the particle will tend to drift toward the part of the triangle corresponding to the two good options (black arrow), where the optimal bound overlaps with the bounds for the max vs next strategy. The grey curves in d-f illustrate accumulator trajectories that are typical for the considered scenarios. (Figure 7b, d) . If only two choices are highly rewarded, 329 our model switches to a 'max-vs.-next' strategy because the particle will quickly drift toward the side of the 330 triangle corresponding to the two high valued choices where the optimal bounds overlap most with the bounds 331 corresponding to the 'max-vs.-average' strategy (Figure 7c,d) . If only one option is highly rewarded, our 332 model reverts to the 'max-vs.-average' model (Figure 7b,e) . Therefore, our model predicts that if humans 333 follow the optimal strategy, they should show similar transitions between the 'max-vs.-average' and the 334 'max-vs.-next' strategies. 335
Discussion
336
In this study we discussed the optimal policy for decisions among more than two valuable options, as well as a 337 possible biological implementation. The resulting policy has nonlinear boundaries and thus differs 338 qualitatively from the simple diffusion models that implement the optimal policy for the two-alternative case 7 . 339 More specifically, this work makes four major contributions. First, we prove analytically that the optimal 340 policy involves a nonlinear projection onto an − 1 dimensional manifold, which can be closely 341 approximated by neural circuits with a nonlinear normalization. Second, apparently "irrational" choice 342 behaviors, such as the violation of the IIA, are reproduced by our optimal model in the presence of variability 343 arising, for instance, from learning or exploration. Third, we found that the distance to threshold must increase 344 with set size for optimal performance. This has already been observed experimentally 10,28 (Figure 4a ), but no 345 computational explanation has ever been offered for this effect until now. Fourth, the model follows Hick's 346 law, that is, it predicts that reaction times in value-based decisions should be proportional to the log of the 347 number of choices plus one, as is commonly observed in behavioral choice data. However, our model does not 348 account for violation of Hick's law for saccadic eye movements effects 48, 49 , or the well know pop-out effect 349 reported in visual search, in which reaction times are independent of the number of items on the screen 50 . 350 Capturing these effects would require that we specialize our model to the specific context of these experiments 351 which lie beyond the scope of the present manuscript. their case, they did not consider noise in the momentary evidence and they did not derive the optimal policy 354 for multi-alternative decision making. Therefore, our work is the first one to demonstrate that an optimal 355 policy for multi-alternative decision making using divisive normalization violates the IIA in the presence of 356 internal noise. Preliminary work by Steverson et al. 51 has also clarified the conditions under which networks 357 with divisive normalization implement the optimal policy for decision making with respect to internal noise, 358 thus suggesting that divisive normalization is indeed required for optimal decision making when all sources of 359 noise are considered. Moreover, recent proof of equivalence between divisive normalization and an 360 information-processing model offers another explanation for the role of divisive normalization: to optimally 361 balance the expected value of the chosen option with the entropic cost of reducing uncertainty in the choice 51 .
362
A well-known strategy to decide among multiple options is the MSPRT 21, 22 , and previous studies have shown 363 that the MSPRT could be implemented/approximated by neural circuits 23,47,52 . However, the MSPRT has not 364 been designed for the problems we consider here. First, it assumes that the decision-maker receives a fixed 365 magnitude of reward based on the accuracy of choices (i.e., whether they are correct or incorrect) in each trial, 366 as in conventional perceptual decision tasks. Value-based decisions, in which the reward magnitude can vary 367 across trials, clearly violate this assumption. Second, it furthermore assumes a constant task difficulty whereas 368 the present study assumes the difficulty of both value-based and perceptual choices to vary across these 369 choices. Third, since the MSPRT is only asymptotically optimal in the limit of infinitely small error rates (i.e. 370 when the model's performance is near 100% correct), it deviates from the optimal policy when this error rate 371
is not negligible 21, 22 . Our present analysis clarifies the properties of the optimal decision policy under multiple 372 options, which differs from the MSPRT by characteristic nonlinear and collapsing decision boundaries. 373 Despite the apparent complexity of those decision boundaries, we found that a symmetry in these boundaries 374 allows the optimal strategies to be approximated by a circuit that features well-known neural mechanisms: 375
RMs whose evidence accumulation process is modulated by normalization, an urgency signal, and nonlinear 376 activation functions. The model provides a consistent explanation for the functional significance of 377 normalization and urgency signal: they are necessary to implement optimal decision policies for 378 multi-alternative choices in which subjects control the decision time. internal noises could result from learning, exploration, uncertain memory or ongoing value inference (e.g., 385 sequentially contemplating features of a particular menu course over time). We assumed simplified generative 386 models with an unbiased and uncorrelated Gaussian prior; future extensions should cover more complex 387 setups including asymmetric mean rewards among options. 388 Note that the present study considers the simplified case in which the value of each option is represented with 389 a scalar variable. We have shown that this model is sufficiently complex to replicate basic behavioral 390 properties such as Hick's law, the violation of IIA, the similarity effect, and the violation of the regularity 391 principle in multi-alternative choices. Future studies should cover more complex situations including value 392 comparisons based on multiple features (e.g., speeds and designs of cars), which can lead to other forms of 393 to neural noise in later processing stages 43, 54 . However, to our knowledge, the optimal policy for these more 399 complex models in which the value function is computed by combining multiple features, presented 400 part, of the seemingly irrational behaviors that have been reported in the literature are a consequence of using 402 the optimal policies for such decisions or genuine limitations of the human decision-making process. 403 Finally, the current model provides several interesting predictions on neural population dynamics: because of 404 the normalization, the collective neural activity could be constrained to a low-dimensional manifold during 405 decision making. The dimensionality of this manifold depends on the number of options ( − 1 dimensions 406 for -alternative choices) whereas the position of the manifold should depend on time, reflecting the effect of 407 the urgency signal. We consider -alternative value-based or perceptual decisions in which the decision-maker responds as soon 524 as she commits to a choice. Value-based and perceptual decisions differ in how choices are associated with 525 reward: in the value-based case the decision-maker reaps the reward associated with the chosen item (e.g., a 526 food item), whereas in perceptual paradigms the amount of reward depends only on whether the choice is 527 "correct" in the current task contexts. In contrast to previous models motivated by biological 528 implementations 12-15 , we start by deriving the optimal, reward-maximizing strategy for multi-alternative 529 decision-making tasks without assuming specific biological implementations, and then ask how this strategy 530 can be implemented by biologically plausible mechanisms. The following formulation applies to both 531 perceptual and value-based tasks. 532 Let ≡ ( 1 , . . . , ) denote hidden variables (e.g., reward magnitudes for value-based tasks, or stimulus 533 contrasts for perceptual tasks) associated with choice options. These true hidden variables vary across 534 trials, and are never observed directly and as such unknown to the decision-maker. Instead, the decision maker 535 observes some noisy momentary evidence with mean , 536 537 for each option ∈ {1, . . , }, in every small time-step of duration . here denotes the covariance 538 matrix of the momentary evidence. Before observing any evidence, the decision-maker is assumed to hold a 539 normally distributed prior belief, 540 541 with mean ̅ and covariance reflecting the statistics of the true prior distribution, ( ). For simplicity, 542
we define the correct option in a perceptual task as the option associated with the largest hidden variable, 543 correct = argmax , which, for example, can be interpreted as the highest contrast in a contrast 544 discrimination task. 545 In both value-based and perceptual tasks, we assume that the decision-maker tries to maximize the 546 expected reward under time constraints. Specifically, we focus on reaction time tasks in which the 547 decision-maker is free to choose at any time within each trial, and proceeds through a long sequence of trials 548 within a fixed time period. The total number of trials, and thus the total reward throughout the entire trial 549 sequence, depends on how rapidly the decision-maker chooses in each trial: faster decisions allow for more of 550 them in the same amount of time. However, due to noisy evidence, collecting more such evidence in each trial 551 yields better choices, which results in a tradeoff between speed and accuracy. 552 accumulating the evidence about them, and optimal rules for stopping the evidence accumulation to make a 556 choice. 557 
Optimal evidence accumulation 558
Here we provide a general formulation that includes correlations among options in the generative models. , using the fact that 561 ′ ( ′ = 1, . . . , ) is independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) across time. This results in 562 stop accumulating evidence and which option to choose at that point. 573 Optimal stopping rules 574 To find the optimal policy, we utilize tools from dynamic programming 17, 18 . One such tool is the "value 575 function" ( ), which can be defined recursively through Bellman's equation. This value function returns for 576 each state of the accumulation process (identified by the sufficient statistics) the total reward (including 577 accumulation cost) the decision maker expects to receive from this state onward when following the optimal 578 policy. 579 Let us first consider this value function for the case of a single choice, in which her aim is to maximize 580 the expected reward for this choice minus some cost per unit time for accumulating evidence (if there were 581 no such cost, no decisions would ever be made). At any point in time , the decision maker can either decide 582 to make a choice, yielding the highest of the expected rewards, or to accumulate more evidence for some 583 small time , resulting in cost -, and expected future reward given by the value function at time + . 584 By Bellman's principle of optimality, the best action corresponds to the one yielding the highest expected 585 ( , ) = { ( , ) , 〈 ( + , ( + ))〉 − } , 587 where the expected rewards ( , ) differ between perceptual and value-based choices (see previous section; 588 in both cases, they are functions of and ), and the expectation in the second term is across expected 589 changes of the accumulated evidence, ( ( + )| ( ), ). The intersection between the two terms within 590 { , } determines the decision boundaries for stopping the evidence accumulation, and thus the optimal policy. 591 In more realistic setups, decision makers make a sequence of choices within a limited time period, in 592 which case the aim of maximizing the total reward becomes equivalent (assuming long time periods) to 593 maximizing their reward rate , which is the expected reward for either choice divided by the expected time function of the value function at time + . Therefore, if we know the value function at some time , we 605 can compute it at time − , then − 2 , and so on, until time = 0. To find the reward rate, which is 606 required to compute the value function, we initially set it to = 0, computed the full value function, and then 607 updated it iteratively by root finding until (0, ̅; ) = 0, re-computing the full value function in each root 608 finding step (see Drugowitsch et al., 2011 55 for the rationale behind this procedure). 609
Unless otherwise mentioned, we used = 10 and = 0.005 for all simulations. That is, we 610 assumed ( = 10, ; ) to be given by the value for immediate choices, and then moved backwards in time 611 in steps of 0.005s to find the value function by backward induction until = 0. Furthermore, we set the prior 612 parameters of the true, latent variables to ̅ = and = . The waiting time was fixed to = 0.5 s, 613 and the accumulation cost to = 0 (i.e., the opportunity cost was the only cost). The results did not 614 change qualitatively when changing the values of these parameters. 615
Boundary structure analysis 616 Interestingly, we found that the decision boundaries in value-based tasks generally have a remarkable 617 symmetry that reduces the optimal policy to a simple neural computation. All the decision boundaries are 618
